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I. INTRODUCTION

The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals recently decided a case that
may change the face of tort damages in West Virginia forever. In Bower v.
Westinghouse, the court held that a plaintiff may recover the cost of future medical
testing "where it can be proven that such expenses are necessary and reasonably
certain to be incurred as a proximate result of a defendant's tortious conduct."'
With this decision, the court recognized the right to recover damages for medical
monitoring. The concept of medical monitoring damages is contrary to the2
longstanding tort tradition that requires a present injury for recovery of damages.
"[A]n action for medical monitoring seeks to recover only the quantifiable costs of
periodic medical examinations necessary to detect the onset of physical harm...
[that may occur in the future]. ' 3
1

Syl. Pt. 2, Bower v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 522 S.E.2d 424 (W. Va. 1999).

2

In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litigation. 916 F.2d 829, 850 (3rd Cir. 1990).

3

See Paoli,916 F.2d at 850.
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The court was faced with the question of "[w]hether, under West Virginia
law, a plaintiff who does not allege a present physical injury can assert a claim for
the recovery of future medical monitoring costs where such damages are the
proximate result of the defendant's tortious conduct."4 Although this question is
straightforward on its face, the answer includes several complex issues of law,
policy, and equity. This note addresses those issues. First, this note surveys the
evolution of tort damages, including the evolution of medical expense damages.
Second, the recognition of medical monitoring as a form of damages in other
jurisdictions is addressed. Next, the decision in Bower v. Westinghouse is analyzed.
This note also addresses the argument for the adoption of a fund mechanism
approach for medical monitoring recovery. Finally, the unanswered questions left
by the court's decision in Bower are discussed.
II.

EVOLUTION OF Toxic TORT DAMAGES

Tort law has historically followed the legal doctrine that "[t]he threat of
future harm, not yet realized, is not enough." 5 Thus, under traditional tort law,
plaintiffs are only able to recover for actual present injuries caused by others not
the possibility of future injures. 6 However, the world has evolved and
environmental science now provides us with the knowledge that certain chemicals
cause disease. As a result, the legal profession is forced to grapple with the
ramifications of toxic torts.
A toxic tort is defined as an alleged personal injury and related harm
resulting from exposure to a toxic substance, usually a chemical, but perhaps a
biological or radiological agent.7 Generally, in toxic tort litigation, the plaintiff is
injured through multiple exposures to a toxic substance over a long period of time.8
An injury from the exposure, if it appears at all, generally manifests itself only after
a latency period, sometimes up to 20 years after the exposure.9 This latency period,
where no actual injury has manifested, causes ambiguity and difficulty in assessing
damages.
Therefore, medical monitoring, as a form of recovery, developed to
compensate those plaintiffs exposed to toxic substances who had not yet developed
an actual injury.10 Medical monitoring is a form of recovery in which plaintiffs may
be compensated for the reasonable costs of periodic diagnostic examinations
4

Id.

5

W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 30, at 165 (5th ed.

1984).
6

See George W. C. McCarter, Medical Sue-Veillance: A History and Critique of the Medical

Monitoring Remedy in Toxic Tort Litigation, 45 RUTGERS L. REv. 227, 229 (1993).
7

See id. n.2.

8

See id.

9

See id. n.4.

10

See id. at 230.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol103/iss1/7

2

Smith Wolfe: Recovery of Medical Monitoring Costs: An Argument for the Fund Me

2000]

THE WAKE OFBOWER V WESTINGHOUSE

throughout the latency period of a disease. 1 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals in
In re PaoliRailroadPCB Litigation (Paoli1), clearly summarized the issue:
Medical monitoring claims acknowledge that, in a toxic age,
significant harm can be done to an individual by a tortfeasor,
notwithstanding latent manifestation of that harm. Moreover, as
we have explained, recognizing this tort does not require courts to
speculate about the probability of future injury. It merely requires
courts to ascertain the probability that the far less costly remedy of
medical supervision is appropriate. Allowing plaintiffs to recover
the cost of this care deters irresponsible discharge of toxic
chemicals by defendants and encourages plaintiffs to detect and
treat their injuries as soon as possible. These are conventional
goals of the tort system ... 12
In the first toxic tort case to address the remedy of medical monitoring,
Morrissy v. Eli Lilly & Co., the plaintiffs asked the court to provide them with
adequate medical management or the opportunity to obtain adequate medical
management of their medical conditions for life. 13 The plaintiffs alleged that the
existence of a latent disease was a present injury. 14 In this case, daughters of
women who had used the drug Diethylstibestrol (DES) during pregnancy brought a
class action suit to recover for alleged injuries received as a result of prenatal
exposure.' 5 "[A]ll members of the proposed class [had] developed cancerous
lesions, adenocarcinoma, adenosis, or certain tumors or cytological abnormalities
which in time [would] generate adenocarcinoma or other cancerous conditions."' 6
A latent period of unknown length existed between the start of carcinoma and the
appearance of observable symptoms which can be diagnosed and treated. 7 In fact,
"many members of the proposed class [did] not know they [were] DES daughters
or, knowing this, that they [were] within a latent period.' '18 Morrissy set the stage
for many more medical monitoring cases to come.

11

See Janet H. Smith, IncreasingFearof Future Injury Claims: Where Speculation Carriesthe Day,
64 DEF. CouNs. J. 547, 553 (1997).
12
In re Paoli Railroad Yard PCB Litigation, 916 F.2d 829, 852 (3rd Cir.1990).
13

Morrissy v. Eli Lilly & Co., 394 N.E.2d 1369, 1372 (Il1.App. Ct. 1979).

14

See id. at 1376.

15

See id. at 1371.

16

Id. at 1372.

17

See id.

18

Morrissy, 394 N.E.2d at 1372.
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RECOGNITION OF MEDICAL MONITORING DAMAGES

Since Morrissy, many more courts have been faced with the issue of
medical monitoring. In Morrissy's wake, the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit addressed medical monitoring in the case of Friends
for All Children,Inc. v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp.19 In 1975,20 "Operation Babylift,"
a rescue mission for Vietnamese orphans, was conducted in the last days of the
United States's presence in South Vietnam. 1 A plane, loaded with 301 passengers,
mostly orphans, took off from Saigon.2 2 "Fifteen minutes after takeoff a locking
system failed, causing the aft ramp and cargo doors to fall off the aircraft. 23 The
interior of the plane "suffered an explosive decompression and loss of oxygen. 24
The plane subsequently crashed and only 149 of the orphans survived. 25
An organization, Friends for All Children, filed a complaint alleging that
Lockheed negligently manufactured the aircraft, thus causing the accident 6 The
group also alleged that "as a result both of the decompression of the troop
compartment and the crash itself, these survivors suffered, inter alia, from a
neurological development disorder generically classified as Minimal Brain
Dysfunction. 27 The court was asked to determine whether District of Columbia
tort law provided "a cause of action for diagnostic examinations in absence of proof
of actual injury., 28 The court found:
It is difficult to dispute that an individual has an interest in
avoiding expensive diagnostic examinations just as he or she has
an interest in avoiding physical injury. When a defendant
negligently invade this interest, the injury to which is neither
speculative nor resistant to proof, it is elementary that the
defendant should make the plaintiff whole by paying for the
examinations. 29
The court in Friendsfor All Children drafted a hypothetical to illustrate the
19

Friends for All Children, Inc. v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 746 F.2d 816 (D.C. Cir. 1984).

20

See id. at 818.

21

See id, at 819.

22

See id.

23

Id.

24

Friendsfor All Children, 746 F.2d at 819.

25

See id.

26

See id.

27

Id.

28

Id. at 819.

29

Id. at 826.
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reasoning used in its decision:
Jones is knocked down by a motorbike which Smith is riding
through a red light. Jones lands on his head with some force.
Understandably shaken, Jones enters a hospital where doctors
recommend that he undergo a battery of tests to determine
whether he has suffered any internal head injuries. The tests prove
negative, but Jones sues Smith solely for what turns out to be the
substantial cost of the diagnostic examinations. From our
example, it is clear that even in the absence of physical injury
Jones ought to be able to recover the cost for the various
diagnostic examinations proximately caused by Smith's negligent
action .... The motorbike rider, through his negligence, caused
the plaintiff, in the opinion of medical experts, to need specific
medical services - a cost that is neither inconsequential nor of a
kind the community
generally accepts as part of the wear and tear
30
of daily life.
Thus, Friends for All Children paved the way for the recovery of medical
monitoring costs.
In 1984, the same year as the Friendsfor All Children decision, the New
York Supreme Court Appellate Division decided the medical monitoring case
Askey v. Occidential Chemical Corp.3' In this case, the plaintiffs brought a class
action suit for personal injuries caused by the alleged discharge of toxic substances
from a landfill. 32 "The novel issue presented [was] whether those persons who have
an increased risk of cancer, genetic damage and other illnesses by reason of their
exposure to the toxic chemicals emanating from the landfill, but whose physical
injuries are not evident, should be certified as a class for the purpose of determining
their right to recover the costs of future medical monitoring services," 33 The court
concluded that "[d]amages for the prospective consequences of a tortious injury are
recoverable only if the prospective consequences may with reasonable probability
be expected to flow from the past harm."' The court concluded further, a plaintiff
may include future medical expenses in his claim if it is proven by expert testimony
to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that such medical expenses will be
incurred.35 Consequently, the New York Supreme Court Appellate Division also
recognized the right of recovery for medical monitoring costs.

30

Friends for All Children, Inc. v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 746 F.2d 816, 825 (D.C. Cir. 1984).

31
32

See Askey v. Occidental Chemical Corp., 102 A.D.2d 130 (N.Y. 1984).
See id. at 131.

33

Id.

34

Id.at 136.
See id. at 137.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2000

5

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 103, Iss. 1 [2000], Art. 7
WEST VIRGINIA LAW RE VIEW

108

[Vol. 103:103

IV. MEDICAL MONITORING RECOVERY IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS
Today, twenty-three jurisdictions recognize medical monitoring as a basis
for recovery.36 In a few states, medical monitoring is a separate cause of action. 7
However, the majority of jurisdictions recognize it simply as an element of
damages.3
Courts recognizing medical monitoring as a form of damages have
wrestled with two primary issues: 1) whether the plaintiff must have a physical
injury; and 2) whether the plaintiff needs to show through expert testimony that
there is a reasonable probability of contracting a disease through the exposure. 39 In
addressing these issues, courts have developed three approaches in making their
decisions.40
The first approach permits the plaintiff to recover without showing a
present injury.41 Under this approach, the plaintiff claims the "alleged fear of future
injury seek[ing] damages for the emotional distress suffered because of the
claimants' concern that injury will occur in the future. 4 2 The New Jersey Supreme
Court, in Ayers v. Township of.Jackson, was the first court to approach the issue in
this manner.4 3 In Ayers, the residents of the Township of Jackson brought suit
against the township for its contamination of water with toxic pollutants.44
The contamination came from a landfill owned and operated by the
township. 45 The township owned and operated a landfill which seeped pollutants
into an aquifer.46 The jury found that the township created a nuisance and a
dangerous condition by operating the landfill.4 7 The jury determined that the
plaintiffs should receive $8,204,500 to cover the future costs of annual medical
surveillance based upon the plaintiffs' increased susceptibility to cancer and other
diseases.48
Of the 339 plaintiffs in Ayers, not one asserted a present exposure-related

36

See Smith, supra note 11, at 553. The 23 jurisdictions do not include West Virginia.

37

See id.

38

See id.

39

See id.at554.

40

See id.at548.

41

See Smith, supra note II, at 548.

42

See id.

43

Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287 (N.J. 1987).

44

See id. at 291.

45

See id.

46

See id.

47

See id.

48

See Ayers, 525 A.2d at 291.
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illness.4 9 The court held, based upon expert testimony showing the toxic effects of
exposure, that the risk of disease was a sufficient injury.5s The court held that the
relevant factors to be considered were: 1) the significance of exposure, 2) the
toxicity of the chemicals, 3) the seriousness of the disease for which the plaintiffs
are at risk, 4) the relative increased risk of contracting the disease, and 5) the value
of early diagnosis. 51 As a result, the plaintiff may recover without showing that he
suffers from a present injury.
The second approach, developed by the Utah Supreme Court in Hansen v.
Mountain Fuel Supply Co., does not require that a plaintiff show a probability of
developing the disease, but instead, only requires that he show the exposure caused
an increased risk of contracting a serious injury.5 2 The plaintiff is not seeking
compensation for his fear of contracting a disease, but instead, is looking to recover
for the full value of future disease.53 His recovery is not based upon whether or not
he will contract the disease, but rather the fact that he can show that he has an
increased risk of doing so. 4 In Hansen, the plaintiffs were exposed to asbestos
while performing renovation work s After expressing their concerns to the
defendant about the composition of the insulation removed, the plaintiffs were told
by the defendant's representative that it did not contain asbestos.5 Thus, the
plaintiffs continued with their work.57 As part of the renovation, insulation was
crushed, tracked through the work site, and particles of the insulation became
airbome.-sa Testing later showed that the material was indeed asbestos 5 9
Consequently, during the renovation, the plaintiffs experienced "coughinqg,
wheezing, shortness of breath, chest tightness, headaches, and severe eye irritation
as a result of their exposure."o However, at the time of the suit, none of the
plaintiffs suffered from any asbestos-related disease.6'
The court held that in order to recover medical monitoring costs, the

49

See id. at 297.

50

See id. at 308.

s1

at312.
See id.

52

Hansen v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 858 P.2d 970,979 (Utah 1993); see Smith, supra note 11, at

548.
53

See Smith, supranote 11, at 553.

54

See id.

55

See Hansen, 858 P.2d at 972.

56

See id.

57

See id.

58

See id. at 972-73.

59

See id. at 973.

60

Hansen v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 858 P.2d 970, 973 (Utah 1993).
See id.

61
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plaintiff must prove: 1) exposure to a toxic substance; 2) that the exposure was
caused by the defendant's negligence; 3) that the exposure resulted in an increased
risk of serious injury, disease, or illness; 4) that a medical test for early detection of
the disease exists; 5) that early detection is beneficial (treatment exists that can alter
the course of the illness); and 6) that the testing has been prescribed by a qualified
physician according to contemporary scientific principles. 62 Additionally, the court
permitted medical monitoring costs only for the duration of the latency period of
the disease, if known.63 Thus, the Utah court in Hansen, by only requiring that the
plaintiff show an increased risk of serious injury, 4 created a lower burden for a
plaintiff to meet than the New Jersey court did in Ayers. Some courts have followed
the Hansen approach, yet have required that the plaintiff show a reasonable
certainty that she will develop the disease, instead of a mere increased risk of
developing a disease.65
Finally, the third approach, used by a minority of jurisdictions,66 requires
an even higher burden be met. These jurisdictions follow traditional tort law.
Consequently, these more traditional jurisdictions require that an actual physical
injury be present before the plaintiff may recover damages. 67
V.

A.

BOWER V. WESTINGHOUSE

Case Background

The West Virginia case that addresses medical monitoring is Bower v.
Westinghouse.68 The plaintiffs in this case claimed that they were exposed to toxic
substances in a "cullet pile" adjacent to their property. 69 The plaintiffs asserted that
the "cullet pile" consisted of various waste materials, including broken light bulbs,
light bulb parts, and other materials from the manufacturing process.70 The cullet
pile covered an area of approximately two acres and varied in depth from about
forty-two feet to two feet.71 Westinghouse Electric Corporation owned and operated
62

See id. at 979.

63

See id. at 981.

64

See id. at 979.

65

See Potter v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795 (Cal. 1993).

66

See Smith, supra note I1, at 555.

67

See Ball v. Joy Mfg. Co., 755 F. Supp. 1344, 1366 (S.D.W.Va. 1990).

68

See Bower v. Westinghouse, 522 S.E.2d 424 (W. Va. 1999).

69

See id. at 426.

70

See Bower, 522 S.E.2d at 426-27; Defendant North American Phillips' Response to Plaintiffs

Brief at 2 n. 1, Bower (No. 99-25338).
See Bower, 522 S.E.2d at 427; Defendant North American Philips' Response to Plaintiff's Brief at

71

4, Bower (No. 99-25338).
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the land on which the pile was located? 2 Westinghouse subsequently sold the
property to the Philips Corporation in 1983. r3 In 1994, Philips voluntarily initiated
testing on the pile to determine its contents and has since begun clean-up75 of the
site.74 Testing revealed the presence of thirty potentially noxious substances.
The plaintiffs asserted five causes of action against the defendants.!6 They
were: "(1) negligent maintenance and operation of the refuse pile; (2) nuisance; (3)
trespass; (4) negligent infliction of emotional distress; and (5) intentional disregard
for the health and safety of plaintiffs. 77 As a part of the damages, the plaintiffs
claimed the costs of future medical monitoring. 78 However, the plaintiffs did not
allege a present physical injury,7 9 nor did they exhibit symptoms of any disease
related to the alleged exposure. 80 The plaintiffs claimed that "exposure to the
hazardous waste has impaired and will impair their health and may cause death...
[and that] ... plaintiffs must incur the future expenses of medical monitoring to
detect the presence of any disease or defect caused by the exposure to the toxic
substances dumped by the Defendants." 8'
B.

The Decision

Bower came to the court as a certified question from the United States
District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia. The district court posed
the question: "[i]n a case of negligent infliction of emotional distress absent
physical injury, may a party assert a claim for expenses related to future medical
monitoring necessitated solely by the fear of contracting a disease from exposure to
toxic chemicals? ' 8 2 However, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals felt that
the District Court did not intend such a narrowly drawn question.8 Therefore, the
72

See Defendant North American Philips' Response to Plaintiff's Brief at 4, Bower (No. 99-25338).

73

See id.

74

See id

See Bower, 522 S.E.2d at 427. The substances discovered include: 4, 4-DDD; aluminum;
antimony; arsenic; barium; benzo(a)pyrene; benzo(b)fluoranthene; beryllium; cadmium; carbon disulfide;

75

chromium; cobalt; copper; dibenzo(9,h)anthracene; ethbenzene; ideno(l,2,3-cd)pyrene; iron; lead; m & pxylenes; magnesium; manganese; mercury; methyl-t-butyl ether (MTBE); nickel; o-xylene; PCB compounds;

touene; tricholorofluoramethane; vanadium; and zinc.
76

See id.

77

Id.

78

See id.at 427; Defendant North American Philips' Response to Plaintiff's Brief at 2, Bower (No.

99-25338).
79

See Defendant North American Philips' Response to Plaintiff's Brief at 2, Bower (No. 99-25338).

8o

See Bower,522 S.E.2d 424, 427.

81

Plaintiffs' Brief at 3, Bower,(No. 99-25338).

82

Bower,522 S.E.2d at 428.

83

See id.The court felt that the question was narrowly drawn because it framed the issue of medical
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court exercised its power to reformulate the question. 84 Ultimately, the court
determined that the true question was "[w]hether, under West Virginia law, a
plaintiff who does not allege a present physical injury can assert a claim for the
recovery of future medical monitoring costs85 where such damages are the proximate
result of the defendant's tortious conduct.,
After reviewing the question, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
held that "a cause of action exists under West Virginia law for the recovery of
medical monitoring costs, where it can be proven that such expenses are necessary
and reasonably certain to be incurred as a proximate result of a defendant's tortious
conduct.""" The court rejected the idea that a claim for future medical expenses
must rely on the existence of a present physical injury.87 The court stated "[t]he
'injury' that underlies a claim for medical monitoring-just as with any other cause
of action sounding in tort-is 'the invasion of any legally protected interest."'88 The
court recognized its past holding, which required that the "future effect of an injury
must be proven with reasonable certainty in order to permit a jury to award an
injured party damages."8 9 However, the court in Bower expounded upon this
previous holding by declaring the plaintiff does not need to demonstrate the
probable likelihood that a serious disease will result from the exposure. 90 The court
agreed with the Third Circuit's decision In re Railroad Yard PCB Litigation (Paoli
1) and stated that the appropriate inquiry is "whether medical monitoring is, to a
reasonable degree of medical certainty, necessary in order to diagnose properly the
warning signs of disease." 91 Furthermore, the court noted that "[p]roof of future
medical expenses is insufficient as a matter of law in the absence of any evidence
monitoring damages in terms of "solely by the fear of contracting the disease."
See id. The power for the court to reformulate a certified question is derived from the West
Virginia Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act, W.Va. Code §§ 51-1A-I through 13. Justice
Maynard disagreed with how the court reformulated the certified question. See discussion infra Part V.C.
85
Id.
84

86

Syl. Pt. 2., Bower, 522 S.E.2d 424, 431.

87

See id.at 430.

88

Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §7(1) (1964)).
Id.at 431 (citing in part Syl. Pt. 9, Jordan v. Bero, 210 S.E.2d 618 (1974)).

89

Id.at 433
91

Bower, 522 S.E.2d 424, 431 (citing In re Paoli Railroad Yard PCB Litigation, 916 F.2d 829, 851

(3rd Cir. 1990)). In Paoli1,38 plaintiffs who had worked in or lived beside the Paoli railyard brought a toxic
tort suit to recover damages for illnesses contracted as a result of exposure to polycholorinated biphenyls
(PCBs). See Paoli I, 916 F.2d at 835. The PCBs were found on the railway property. See id. The plaintiffs
sought to recover the costs of periodic medical testing that they contended was necessary to protect against
the exacerbation of latent diseases caused by their exposure to PCBs. See id. at 849. The court held that the
plaintiffs could recover medical monitoring costs by proving that "1.Plaintiff was significantly exposed to a
proven hazardous substance through the negligent actions of the defendant. 2. As a proximate result of
exposure, plaintiff suffers a significantly increased risk of contracting a serious latent disease. 3. That
increased risk makes periodic diagnostic medical examinations reasonably necessary. 4. Monitoring and
testing procedures exist which make the early detection and treatment of the disease possible and beneficial."
Id.at 852.
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as to the necessity and cost of such future medical expenses."9 Accordingly, the
court specified the requisite elements that the plaintiff must prove to recover the
costs of medical monitoring:
In order to sustain a claim for medical monitoring expenses under
West Virginia law, the plaintiff must prove that (1) he or she,
relative to the general population, has been significantly exposed;
(2) to a proven hazardous substance; (3) through the tortious
conduct of the defendant; (4) as a proximate result of the
exposure, plaintiff has suffered an increased risk of contracting a
serious latent disease; (5) the increased risk of disease makes it
reasonably necessary for the plaintiff to undergo periodic
diagnostic medical examinations different from what would be
prescribed in the absence of the exposure; and (6) monitoring
procedures exist that make the early detection of a disease
possible.93
1.

Requisite Elements

The court stated in its decision the six elements to be considered in
medical monitoring cases but was somewhat ambiguous in defining some of the
elements of a medical monitoring claim. However, because the court chose to
substantially adopt the Third Circuit's holding in Paoli I,' analysis of PaoliI may
lead to an understanding of the elements for a medical monitoring claim under
West Virginia law. Also, the Bower court cited other cases which provide further
insight. Therefore, the text below analyzes the West Virginia claim to include when
necessary the court's possible future reliance on PaoliI and other cases cited in the
Bower decision. Furthermore, the discussion identifies issues the court has left open
for interpretation.
a. Significant Exposure. The court acknowledged the element of
"significant exposure" in one sentence. Prior to the attachment of any liability for
the cost of medical monitoring, the plaintiff must be exposed to a hazardous
substance.9 Thus, the court merely specified that the plaintiff be exposed.
However, the court failed to define or quantify significant exposure. Even so, in the
future, the court may choose to define "significant exposure" based upon a recent
Third Circuit opinion.
The Third Circuit has defined significant exposure under a Federal Tort
92

Id. at 432 (citing Syl. Pt. 16 Jordan,210 S.E.2d 618).

93

Syl. Pt. 3 Id..

94

See id. at 432.

See id. at 433; cf Johnson v. West Virginia Univ. Hosp., Inc., 413 S.E.2d 889, 893 (W. Va.
1991)("before a recovery for emotional distress damages may be made due to a fear of contracting a disease.
..there must first be exposure to the disease.")(emphasis in. original).
95
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Claims Act action where medical monitoring damages were sought.96 In Redland
Soccer Club, Inc. v. Department of the Army of the United States, the Army sold
property, which was formerly a landfill, to a township.97 The township then
transformed it into a soccer field.9 The majority of the plaintiffs were seeking
medical monitoring damages.9 The plaintiff was required to show a significant
exposure to a proven hazardous substance. 1°° The Third Circuit acknowledged that
in its previous holding, in Paoli I, significant exposure was not defined.1 '
Therefore, the court took this opportunity to define the term and stated that
"'[s]ignificant exposure,' . . . refers to an exposure which, either by duration or
harm, is sufficient to cause a significantly increased risk, which in turn is sufficient
to require a monitoring regime different from that normally required in the absence
of such an exposure. ' ' 02 In other words,
[A] plaintiff must not only show exposure, but must prove that he
was exposed beyond what would normally be encountered by a
person in everyday life, so that the plaintiffs risk of being injured
from the exposure is greater, in some way,
than the normal risks
10 3
all of us encounter in our everyday lives.
b. Proven Hazardous Substance. The court was short in its explanation
of "proven hazardous substance." The court requires the plaintiff to prove through
scientific evidence that there is a probable link between exposure to a particular
compound and human disease.lt 4 However, the court did not choose to elaborate
upon what constitutes a "probable link." Additionally, the court did not expound
upon the definition of "human disease." Thus, the court's brevity creates room for
broad interpretation. For example, will a disease of mild severity with a low
probable link to exposure suffice?
c. Tortious Conduct. The court stated that the underlying liability for
medical monitoring costs "must be established based upon a recognized tort - e.g.,
negligence, strict liability, trespass, intentional conduct, etc."' 0 5 The defendant must

96

See Redland Soccer Club, Inc. v. Department of the Army of the United States, 55 F.3d 827 (3rd

Cir 1995).
97

See id. at 834-35.

98

See id. at 835.

99

See id. at 834.

100

See id. at 845.

1l

See RedlandSoccer, 55 F.3d at 845.

102

See id. at 846.

103

Id.

104

See Bower, 522 S.E.2d at 433.

105
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be at fault in exposing the plaintiff to a hazardous substance.' °6 Additionally, the
fault must be established through the application of existing theories of tort
liability. 0 7 The court quoted the Potter v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co.'0 8
decision of the California Supreme Court, stating: "[riecognition that a defendant's
conduct has created the need for future medical monitoring does not create a new
tort. It is simply a compensable item of damage when liability is established under
traditional theories of recovery."' 0 9 Under this analysis, the plaintiff must prove the
elements of an established tort.
However, the court left open a wide door. The court went on to state,
"[t]his is not to say that a plaintiff may not, as a matter of pleading, assert a
separate cause of action based upon medical monitoring; rather, it means that
underlying liability must be established based upon a recognized tort."'1 0
Consequently, not only has the court recognized the availability of medical
monitoring damages, but the court has set the stage for a separate medical
monitoring cause of action, as long as the liability for the claim rests in a
recognized tort. Furthermore, this statement indicates the court's willingness to
entertain medical monitoring claims for any type of tort.
d. Increased Risk. A plaintiff need not show that a particular disease is
certain or even likely to occur as a result of exposure to a hazardous substance."'
The plaintiff need only show that his/her risk of contracting a particular disease has
significantly increased when compared to the risk of contracting the disease absent
the exposure.' 1 2 The court stated that "[n]o particular level of quantification is
necessary to satisfy this requirement."' 13 Therefore, if taken literally, any increase
in risk, even 0.000001 percent would satisfy this element. Thus, the discretion of
the individual trial court will be very important in analyzing this element.
e. Necessity of Diagnostic Testing. The court found that in order for
diagnostic testing to be necessary, it must be "reasonably necessary" in that "it
must be something that a qualified physician would prescribe based upon the
demonstrated exposure to a particular toxic agent." ' 1 4 The court states that the
financial cost and frequency of testing should not be given significant weight in
determining the reasonable basis for undergoing medical testing." 5 Additionally,
106

See id.

107

See id.

108

Potter v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795 (Cal. 1993)(en bane).

109

Bower, 522 S.E.2d at 433 (citing Potter,863 P.2d at 823).

110

Id.

ill

See id (citing Potter,863 P.2d at 824).

112

See id.

113

Id. (citing Hansen, 858 P.2d at 979).

114

Id. at 433.

115

See Bower, 522 S.E.2d at 433.
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the court expresses the idea that the subjective desires of the plaintiff for
information concerning the state of his or her116health can be considered as part of
the decision making process by the trial court.
f Existence of MonitoringProcedure.In order for a plaintiff to recover the
cost of medical monitoring, there must first be a monitoring test available. 117 The
court reasoned: "[i]f no such test exists, then periodic monitoring is of no assistance
and the cost of such monitoring is not available." ' 1 8 The court determined that
when there is no medical testing currently available, the plaintiff will have a future
right at such later time when a test is developed to demonstrate the effectiveness of
test, so
the test." 9 Therefore, the plaintiff will be compensated for using the new
120
long as all of the other five elements of the cause of action are satisfied.
However, in defining the existence of monitoring procedures, the court did
not address the timeframe in which all six elements must be met. For example, if a
plaintiff was able to fulfill elements one through five, but was unable to show the
existence of monitoring procedures at the present time, could the court order
recovery ten years from now when a procedure was developed? Furthermore, when
would a plaintiff need to prove the elements? If she knew there was no monitoring
procedure available at the present time, should she bring her suit now in order to
preserve her claim or should she wait until a procedure was developed, running the
risk of lost evidence, the bad memories of witnesses, etc.? The fairness of this issue
requires that some sort of statute of limitation or repose be implemented. If not,
defendants could conceivably be on the hook for many years, not knowing when or
how they will be held liable. Therefore, the timing for meeting all of the elements
for the claim must be clarified.
2.

Current Treatment

It is important to note that the court rejected the idea that there must be a
current treatment for the disease that is the subject of medical monitoring. Some
jurisdictions have required that in order to recover the cost of medical monitoring,
there must be a way to treat the patient's illness once it is discovered,' 2' otherwise
"there is no cause of action because medical monitoring cannot fulfill its
purpose.' ' 122 In its reasoning, the court stated that "[i]n this age of
advancing
23
medical science, we are hesitant to impose such a static requirement.,'0
116

See id.

117

See id.

118

Id. (citing Bourgeois v. AP. Green Indus., Inc., 716 So.2d 355, 361 (La. 1998)).

119
120

See id (citing Hansen, 858 P.2d at 979 n.12).
See Bower, 522 S.E.2d at 433 (citing Hansen, 858 P.2d at 979 n. 12).

121

See Hansen, 858 P.2d at 979.

122

Id. at 980.

123

Bower, 522 S.E.2d at 434.
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The court looked to the Louisiana Supreme Court's decision in Bourgeois
v. A.P. Green Indus., Inc. to justify its decision:
One thing that ...a plaintiff might gain [even in the absence of

available treatment] is certainty as to his fate, whatever it might
be. If a plaintiff has been placed at an increased risk for a latent
disease through exposure to a hazardous substance, absent medical
monitoring, he must live each day with the uncertainty of whether
the disease is present in his body. If, however, he is able to take
advantage of medical monitoring and the monitoring detects no
evidence of disease, then, at least for the time being, the plaintiff
can receive the comfort of peace of mind. Moreover, even if
medical monitoring did detect evidence of an irreversible and
untreatable disease, the plaintiff might still achieve some peace of
mind through this knowledge by getting his financial affairs in
order, making lifestyle changes, and, even perhaps, making peace
with estranged loved ones or with his religion. Certainly, those
options should be available to the innocent plaintiff who finds
himself at an increased risk for a serious latent disease through no
fault of his own.' 24
3.

Form of Payment

Following its decision permitting the recovery of medical monitoring
costs, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals briefly addressed the form
which such recovery should take. Although the defendant CBS Corporation, along
with several amici curiae, argued that the plaintiffs should only be compensated for
costs through a court administered fund, 25 the court determined that there was no
need to "constrain the discretion of the trial courts" in developing appropriate
remedies in such cases. 26
Notwithstanding, the court did note that there may be situations where a
court administered fund would be beneficial.' 27 However, the court made no
indication of when it deemed the fund mechanism appropriate. The only hint given
in the Bower decision appears in a quote from Ayers v. Township of Jackson: "the
use of a court-supervised fund to administer medical-surveillance payments in mass
exposure cases . . . is a highly appropriate exercise of the Court's equitable

124

Id. (citing Bourgeois v. A.P. Green Indus., Inc., 716 So.2d 355, 363 (La. 1998) (Calogero, C.J.,

concurring)).
125

See id. at 434.

126

Id.

127

See id.
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powers. 1 26 Thus, the court's discussion of lump-sum awards and fund awards
leaves much to be desired. The court's vagueness will create great debate on this
issue.
C.

Justice Maynard'sDissent

Justice Maynard dissented to the majority's opinion stating, "I believe that
West Virginia law does not permit an independent cause of action to recover future
medical monitoring costs absent physical injury, and this Court has no authority to
create such a cause of action. '129 He argues that the court overstepped its authority
to reformulate the certified question presented by the District Court. 30 "The
District Court set forth a clear, concise, and limited question.' 13' Next, he asserts
that the court violated the separation of powers by usurping the Legislature's
authority to enact laws. 32 The court has exceeded the right of the Legislature to
create new causes of action. 33 Lastly, Justice Maynard contends that even if the
court has the authority to create causes of action, the decisioh in Bower is wrong
because it overturns the "200 year old tort principle that a plaintiff may not recover
,34
damages unless he or she has a present injury. . ...
The court originally focused on the certified question of whether medical
monitoring damages could be recovered in negligent infliction of emotional distress
cases. 135 If the court had stayed the course with the original certified question and
granted the recovery of medical monitoring costs, the next logical step in the
evolution of tort law would have been the expansion of the remedy to all torts. The
equities involved here are key. A plaintiff who has the fear of contracting a disease
has access to the medical monitoring remedy. Yet, a person who has also been
exposed but does not exhibit the fear of contracting the disease is not afforded the
same remedy, even though the risk of contracting the disease is the same. The
decision to permit medical monitoring recovery in negligent infliction of emotional
distress claims would give rise to this sort of equities question. Thus in the future,
the courts would have to deal with the possible expansion of this remedy to other
causes of action.
128

Bower, 522 S.E.2d at 434 (emphasis added by court) (citing Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 525

A.2d 287, 314 (1987)).
Id. at 434. The author agrees with Justice Maynard in his argument that the Court overstepped its
powers in determining that there is a separate cause of action for medical monitoring costs. However, this
article deals with the state of the law as it is in West Virginia following the Court's decision in Bower v.
Westinghouse.
129

130

See id.

131

Id.

132

See Bower, 522 S.E.2d at 435.
See id.

134
135

Id.
See id. at 428.
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When the court reformulated the District Court's question," it took the
opportunity to not only provide for medical monitoring recovery in cases like
Bower, but also to expand the form of recovery to all types of tort cases.137
Therefore, the court jumped ahead in the natural process of tort law evolution and
granted recovery of medical monitoring in all types of torts, thus perhaps saving
years of litigation and expense to reach the same desired effect. The impact of this
portion of the decision will perhaps have the most profound effect on West Virginia
tort law. Now, plaintiffs who do not meet the requirements of a negligent infliction
of emotional distress claim, will have an avenue of recovery if they are able to fit
their claim into the constructs of any recognized tort action under West Virginia
law.
VI. THE FUND V. LUMP-SUM PAYMENT: THE ARGUMENT FOR THE FUND SYSTEM
APPROACH IN WEST VIRGINIA

After a plaintiff has met the requirements for medical monitoring recovery,
the court must then determine the form of the relief: whether to award money
damages at law or under equity require the defendant to pay for the medical
examinations the plaintiff chooses to undergo. 13 The form of recovery the court
chooses primarily depends upon what it considers to be the purpose of the
remedy. 39
If the court's purpose in making the award is to deter defendants or to
encourage the filing of the maximum number of claims, a lump-sum payment
should be used.140 A lump-sum system permits an expeditious recovery by the
plaintiff. However, there will be no guarantee that the money awarded will be used
to pay for medical monitoring or that the plaintiff will submit to the testing. 4 '
On the other hand, if the court wants to protect public health and
encourage those exposed to hazardous materials to submit to testing, the court
should create a fund mechanism to reimburse plaintiffs for their actual medical
expenses. 42 The fund system provides specific relief for the plaintiff, not
damages. 4 3 Nevertheless, the burden on the court and the defendant would be
greater due to the administration tasks associated with a fund.'" Additionally, the
court must specify the duration of the fund and how to handle any unclaimed
136

See id. at 428-29.

.137

See Bower, 252 S.E.2d at 433.

138

See McCarter, supra note 6, at 253.

139

See id.

140

See id.

141

See id. at 256.

142

See id. at 253.

143

See McCarter, supranote 6, at 262.

144

See id. at 260-62.
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145
monies after the fund is terminated.
Because of the concerns the court enumerated in Bowers, West Virginia
should adopt the fund mechanism for disbursing medical monitoring damages. In
order to address the merits of a fund system, it is first important to recognize the
policy issues behind medical monitoring recovery in West Virginia. The court gave
a detailed account of policy considerations in the Bowers decision. 146 "First, there is
an important public health interest in fostering access to medical testing for
individuals whose exposure to toxic chemicals creates enhanced risk of disease,
particularly in light of the value of early diagnosis and treatment for many cancer
patients. '147 Second, the court acknowledged the deterrence value of recognizing
medical monitoring claims. 148 Granting plaintiffs the opportunity to recover deters
defendants from the irresponsible discharge of toxins. 149 Third, permitting plaintiffs
to recover for medical monitoring provides for a "substantial remedy before the
consequences of the plaintiffs' exposure are manifest."'" Additionally, the plaintiff
may also have the chance to mitigate or prevent the future illness and "thus reduce
the overall costs to the responsible parties." 151 "Finally, societal notions of fairness
and elemental justice are better served by allowing recovery of medical monitoring
costs.' ' 15 2 It is inequitable for a plaintiff who was wrongfully exposed to dangerous
toxic substances to have to pay the expenses of his own monitoring tests when the
tests are a result of the exposure.'
These policy issues focus on public health concerns and the deterrence of
defendant behavior.' 54 In relating its policy concerns, the court spoke of the
"societal notions of fairness and elemental justice" which are better served by
permitting the recovery of medical monitoring costs. 155 This statement lays the
foundation to argue for the use of the fund system to disperse medical monitoring

costs.

Fairness and justice are the cornerstones of the fund system because the
system provides payment to the plaintiff for medical monitoring services he
received. The plaintiff receives needed medical services and just compensation,
while the defendant makes its restitution. Furthermore, the plaintiff, in exchange
145

See id. at 260-61.

146

See Bower v. Westinghouse, 522 S.E.2d 424,431 (W. Va. 1999)(citing Potter,863 P.2d at 824).

147

Id.

148

See id. (citing Potter,863 P.2d at 824).

149

See id.

150

Id.(quoting Ayers, 525 A.2d at 312).

151

Bower, 522 S.E.2d at 431 (W. Va. 1999) (quoting Potter,863 P.2d at 824).

152

Bower, 522 S.E.2d at 431 (quoting Potter,863 P.2d at 824).

153

See id.

154

See id.

155

Id.
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for receiving his compensation, is required to seek the medical attention he needs.
All the while, the exchange is done in a manner fair and just to all parties involved.
Both plaintiffs and defendants are better served by the use of court administered
funds in medical monitoring cases. Neither is unjustly burdened or enriched.
Additionally, the public as a whole will reap the rewards because as a result of
plaintiffs obtaining medical monitoring services public health is promoted.
A.

The Benefits

The fund mechanism possesses many benefits, which support the
following underlying premise. "Anyone who has undergone rigorous medical
examinations will acknowledge that they often involve inconvenience, discomfort
and some degree of risk."'-r6 George McCarter suggests there are two policy
considerations which follow this assumption: "(1) a person will not lightly submit
to such procedures and so should not be lightly compensated for them, and (2)
when such procedures are indeed 'medically necessary,' a person should be
encouraged to undergo them, despite the associated risk and inconvenience.' 15 7 He
suggests that awarding unrestricted
158money damages for medical monitoring is to
ignore these policy considerations.
The court administered fund has the advantage of limiting the liability of
the defendants to the actual expenses incurred.15 9 "A lump-sum verdict attempts to
estimate future expenses, but cannot predict the amounts that actually will be
expended for medical purposes."'60 Additionally, the fund approach will encourage
plaintiffs to "safeguard their health by not allowing them the option of spending the
money for other purposes.'' Moreover, the mechanism prevents plaintiffs who are
not concerned with their health and fail to undergo treatment from receiving
windfall profits from the award. 16 2 Furthermore, the fund mechanism provides a
way for offsetting the defendant's liability by payments from collateral sources,
primarily the insurance benefits available to some plaintiffs. 63
The fund mechanism helps to ensure that monetary resources will be
available to plaintiffs when they need them.'" "[E]nabling courts to determine
liability and issue a final judgment as soon as the excess risk became apparent
rather than only after victims [become] ill, insurance fund judgments could
156

See McCarter, supra note 6, at 255.

157

Id. at 255-56.

1Sa

See id. at 256.

159

See Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287,314 (N.J. 1987).

160

Id.

161

Id.

162

See McCarter, supranote 6, at 256.

163

See id.

164

See id. at 256.
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significantly reduce the danger that the responsible firm would lack the assets to
compensate victims."' 6 Likewise, the fund approach prevents defendants from
using latency periods to evade claims that come in at a later time."
"The public health interest is served by a fund mechanism that encourages
regular medical monitoring for victims of toxic exposure.' ' 167 At least one court, the
Ayers court, has recognized that this public interest is best served when public
entities are defendants and fund mechanisms are used.' 68 In these public entity
cases, the use of a fund which limits liability to amounts actually incurred tends to
reduce insurance costs and taxes. 169 The court in Ayers stated that "[i]n litigation
involving public-entity defendants, we conclude that the use of a fund to administer
general rule, in the absence of factors
medical-surveillance payments should be the
70
that render it impractical or inappropriate.'
It stands to reason that this rationale should be extended beyond public
entities and to its logical conclusion: The fund mechanism is the appropriate means
to provide medical monitoring recovery in all cases. Public entity defendants are
not the only defendants held liable for medical monitoring costs, nor should they be
the only defendants with the ability to utilize the fund system to meet their
liabilities. Even if the defendant is not a public entity, the benefits of using the fund
mechanism are the same: Defendants meet their liability and plaintiffs receive their
needed medical testing. All defendants in medical monitoring cases should be
subject to the fund mechanism of payment. West Virginia should embrace the fund
mechanism approach in medical monitoring claims. The benefits of the fund
approach are such that the court's interest in "societal notions of fairness and
elemental justice"' 171 is fulfilled.
B.

The Costs

A fund system is not without its costs. There are both administrative and
procedural issues that must be addressed. 72 These decisions must be made by the
trial courts, not juries. 73 The court in Ayers addressed this concern by stating:

165

Id. at 259 (quoting David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public

Law" Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REv. 851, 921-22 (1984)).
166

Id.

167

Ayers, 525 A.2d at314.

168

See id.

169

See u.

170

Id

Bower v. Westinghouse, 522 S.E.2d 424, 431 (W. Va. 1999) (citing Potter v. Firestone Tire and
Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795, 824).
172
See Ayers, 525 A.2d at 314.
171

173

See id. at 314 n.14.
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[i]t is beyond ihe scope of this opinion to set down guidelines for
trial courts in establishing and administering such funds. A courtappointed administrator will be required. The cost of
administration should be borne by defendants. A procedure should
be established for the submission and review of claims for
payment, and to determine the availability of collateral source
benefits. We are confident that satisfactory procedures can be
developed by trial courts on a case-by-case basis. 74
The adoption of a fund approach to medical monitoring damages would require the
trial courts in West Virginia to take on the responsibility of providing oversight to
fund administration. This oversight would place an additional burden on the court
system. However, the equities and benefits of the fund system far outweigh the
additional responsibility placed upon the courts. Promoting societal fairness and
justice is an important function of the court system and a stated policy goal of
allowing damages for medical monitoring costs. Therefore, accepting the duty of
administration would further the courts' function and the policy considerations of
medical monitoring.
VII. THE MITIGATION OF DAMAGES

Another issue of concern arising out of the recovery of medical monitoring
costs deals with the issue of damage mitigation. If a plaintiff is awarded medical
monitoring costs, but fails to submit to medical testing, could he return and sue the
defendant for actual damages when an injury occurs?
One of the policy reasons for granting medical monitoring awards is to
foster access to medical tests, especially with the possibility for the plaintiff to take
advantage of the value of early diagnosis and treatment.175 Additionally, permitting
plaintiffs to recover for medical monitoring provides for a "substantial remedy
before the consequences of the plaintiffs' exposure are manifest.' 7 6 Consequently,
the plaintiff may also have the chance to mitigate or prevent the future illness and
"thus reduce the overall costs to the responsible parties.' 77
Based on the policy issues behind medical monitoring recovery, it is
logical that a plaintiff who receives a medical monitoring award and subsequently
fails to submit to testing, should not be able to recover damages when and if a
disease develops. Damages should at least be limited to the extent to which he
failed to mitigate his damages. By awarding damages for medical monitoring the
court is not just providing money to the plaintiff, it is granting an opportunity for
early detection and treatment. A plaintiff who fails to take advantage of this chance

Id.
175

See Bower, 522 S.E.2d at 431 (citing Poter,863 P.2d at 824).
Id.

177

Id.
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after he has sought it, should not have the opportunity to force the defendant to pay
more. Understandably, it would be difficult to quantify the extent to which the
plaintiff has failed to mitigate his damages. However, the judicial system has a
history of quantifying the unquantifiable. Here too, it should be done.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

West Virginia has followed the lead of many other jurisdictions by
recognizing medical monitoring as a form of recovery under tort law. Although the
court has left some unanswered questions with its decision in Bower v.
Westinghouse, the fairness and justice of the decision should be appreciated.
Providing plaintiffs who have been wrongly exposed to toxic substances the
opportunity to continuously monitor their health for early detection of diseases,
such as cancer, is logical. Tort law has long recognized that the wrong-doer should
pay for his wrong, and now he can be held accountable for monitoring the health of
those he wronged.
Although the court failed to reach this conclusion, a review of the court's
policy considerations suggests that the fund mechanism is the appropriate means of
recovery to the plaintiff. This system makes sure that the defendant pays for the
medical monitoring costs which are actually incurred and encourages plaintiffs to
undergo medical testing. It removes the temptation for the plaintiff of spending a
lump-sum award on something other than medical monitoring costs. Thus, by
recognizing medical monitoring costs, the court's goals of societal notions of
fairness and elemental justice are better served.
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has changed the face of tort
damages. However, the questions left unanswered by the court in Bower will
generate debate and further litigation in the years to come.
Shannon L. Smith Wolfe"
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